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Abstract: 
In the post-cold war era, the US and China have shaped their identities by adopting different 
foreign policies in Asia-Pacific. This paper takes a constructivist view to analysis the change of 
their identities in relations to interactions with other countries in the region. The traditional 
basis of US foreign policy is the zero-sum logic inherited from the Cold War, by which it 
perceives any other rising superpower as a threat to its security. This approach had led to the 
imperialist idea under Bush 41 and Bush 43, through the ‘New World Order’ and ‘war on 
terror’, where Clinton focused on domestic liberalizations. This essay will argue that the US 
identity is perceived as the ‘world policeman’ and ‘global leader’, and the Asia-rebalancing 
strategy under Obama reflects the ‘containment policy’ towards China. Where China constructs 
itself as a peacefully developing power especially in the ‘One Belt One Road‘ policy. The case 
study of ASEAN had reflected the change of the US and China identities through their 
interaction with those Southeast Asian countries. It is concluded that to achieve a sustainable 
world order, there needs to be more positive interactions between China and the US with 
bilateral cooperations instead of competitions. 
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1. THEORETICAL BASIS-CONSTRUCTIVISM & NATIONAL IDENTITY 
National identity is defined as ‘one's identity or sense of belonging to one state or to one nation’ 
( Ashmore; Jussim; Wilder, 2001)，and ’the sense of a nation as a cohesive whole, as 
represented by distinctive traditions, culture, language and politics’ according to Oxford 
Dictionary. A key point of the constructivist theory is its recognition of the identity of the 
actors, and how the identity had shaped policies. As Flockhart has kindly asserted, 
‘Constructivism is a useful tool not only for understanding foreign policy, but also as a guide 
for prescribing foreign policy’(cited in Smith,2012), where the basic constructivist ideas are 
identity, rules, social construction & practice. Constructivism had developed in response to the 
failure of realism and liberalism, it had made a good attempt to solve the problems in the post-
cold war order. Constructivists argue against the realist idea that the world has shaped people’s 
opinion, instead they suggest that it is people’s idea which had constructed the world order. 
I will discuss on a constructivist basis, about how the national identities of the US and China 
had largely shaped their foreign policies in Asia-Pacific region. The identity of the US as a 
world leader to promote the free trade had shaped its policy as a hegemonic power influencing 
the Asia-Pacific region, mostly in the Post-Cold War era. The identity of China as a rapidly 
developing socialist country, with the claimed devotion to its tradition of Confucian idea of 
‘peace’, had shaped its policy as a peacefully rising state seeking cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific region, and gaining increasing economic dominance in the 21st century.  
This dissertation aims to argue that the identities of the US and China have changed through 
their interactions with other countries in Asia-Pacific. Western scholars draw significantly on 
the constructivist view of identity in their evaluation of US foreign policy. Notably, in the 
chapter ’Identities and US foreign policies’(Smith, 2012), Rowley and Weldes have identified 
the central role of identity in constructing US foreign policy, in contrast to the realist 
explanations of national interests as the primary factor driving US foreign policy. The literature 
adopts a critical social constructivist approach and argues that conceptions of US identity 
constitute US interests, thus providing the foundations for US foreign policy. This has drawn a 
link between the national identity and the national interest in relations to the foreign policy 
making, and identified the national identity as the initial driver of the policy making. Therefore 
national identity has constituted the national interest of the state, and state actors produced the 
foreign policies based on the national interest. 
Constructivism illustrates the national interest as ‘Security-oriented’, where security is socially 
constructed. In my research case of the US, it has been its main national interest to confront 
China, which is driving by its security awareness against any potential threat. China’s identity 
was also shaped by its expanding cooperation with East Asian countries. However, some 
scholars have argued otherwise. Alexander Wendt in 1992 has rejected the realist ‘self-
interested’ idea and security-oriented conception of state interest, instead he argued for 
‘anarchy is what states make of it’(cited in Weldes, 1996), Wendt further argues that ‘Self-
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interested’, ‘security-oriented’ conceptions are not produced by or deducible from the systemic 
condition of anarchy, and he had asserted the key role played by identity and interest in the 
social construction, and that how the rules constrain the practices in a society.(Wendt, 1992). 
This essay will further explain how the American identity was constructed by the state actors in 
relation to the US national interest. It will discuss how the Americans act towards other states 
based on the meanings that those states have for them, with consideration given to how foreign 
policy can build up the national interest. 
This paper is based on the key constructivist theory asserted by Alexandrov: ‘the interests of 
states are shaped by their identities, while state identities themselves are subject to change in 
the process of interaction.’ (Alexandrov, 2003). In the context of this essay, this could refer to 
the regional integration process in Asia-Pacific in relations to the role of the US and China and 
the interaction between the agencies, in the process of the development of these countries. T he 
US identity as a hegemonic power had been developed in its monopoly of the trades with East 
Asian countries like Japan and South Korea, and its military supply to the South-east Asian 
countries in the South China Sea dispute. Whereas China’s identity is shaped as a newly 
developed socialist country with increasing engagement in the economic cooperation between 
ASEAN and APEC. 
Constructivism sees identity as how the state had differentiated friends and enemies, where 
actors attribute meaning to others and act accordingly (Joao,2016). The national identities of 
China and the US are shaped through their interactions with other Asia-Pacific countries, and 
led to the change of their foreign policies in relations to each other. China has growing 
economic weight in the multilateral institutions like ASEAN, with its policy of ‘peaceful 
development’, while the US sees China as a threat to its leadership in the Asia-Pacific region 
and responds with expanding influence in the region, on the purpose to contain China. With the 
‘containment’ policy, the US has constructed itself as a ‘world policeman’, while on the view 
from Beijing, it’s behaving as a ‘hegemon’ based on imperialist idea.   
China & the US National Identity 
The rivalry between China and the US is rooted from their different ideological approach, 
which shaped their national identities respectively. As a legacy from the Cold War, China was 
identified as the communist alliance with the USSR and the US as the leading liberal power in 
the western democratic world, playing their roles accordingly, the US focused on expanding 
liberal market while China concentrated on infrastructure development. It is not until the 21st 
century that China becomes a rising power in competition with the US. Since then the clash of 
the national interest between the US and China become a problem, which could be explained 
by the model of the zero-sum game, when one state gains in the region, the other one loses 
relatively in its interest. 
The US had become the hegemonic power since the end of the WWII, as the predominant 
economic and military power in the world, it claimed to be a ‘resident Pacific power’(Emmers, 
Volume 13, No. 1 
26 
2013). Since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the US had been leading the ‘War on 
terror’ with the aids of its western allies. In the recent decades, the US has refocused its 
diplomacy towards the Asia-Pacific. During the Obama administration, the world had 
witnessed the US retreating their interest from Europe and tend to adopt an Asia-Pacific 
rebalancing strategy. 
The US has drowned its identity on the self-styled image as the ‘leader’ of the Western 
hemisphere and as the global champion of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’. In a further analysis, the 
legitimacy for US ‘world leadership’ is being tested and challenged by the new order in the 
region, and particularly the rise of China, which had growing economic weight in the Asia-
Pacific region and had increasingly played a key role in the cooperation with other countries 
through the regional institutions. There are some other theories to illustrate the US national 
identity, notably Monten’s exceptionalism which described the US as an exception from 
international politics, and Ikenberry’s theorem of American hegemony, where he suggests a 
US-led western order by re-investing in and strengthening the existing institutions. 
Whereas the national identity of China is shaped by the west, particularly during the early 
communist era, as ‘totalitarian and dictatorship’, and China’s rise in the globalised world as a 
threat to the western democratic world. The ‘threat theory’ has emphasized China’s ambition to 
take over the hegemony from the US. This essay will argue against those theories, as I will 
illustrate, since the end of the Cold War, that China is adopting a strategy of peaceful rising. 
With the promotion of Confucian ideas as the character of the Chinese culture, the Chinese 
authority is shaping the identity of the state as a peacefully developing power focusing on its 
domestic economy, while strengthening the cooperation with other countries in the region, and 
increasing its weight in the regional institutions such as ASEAN and APEC. The ‘peaceful rise’ 
strategy since 2000 has demonstrated an intention to work within the pre-existing international 
order and not against it. In relations to economics and military, China had gained substantial 
economic power, yet not much military power, where it demonstrates rapid development on 
domestic construction and a relative peace in foreign policy-making. The situation in relations 
to the interaction of the US and China with other Asia-Pacific countries has been depicted as 
‘Increasingly, Asian countries are seeking economic ties with China; Continuously, those 
countries are relying on the US militarily’ (Ikenberry,2004). This essay will argue that a 
sustainable world order relies on a ‘new type of relationship’ between China and the US where 
mutual intentions and interactions are critical in the bilateral relation, with the rejection of zero-
sum competition and enhancement of positive cooperation between the two. 
2. THE AMERICAN IDENTITY AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY  
The end of the Cold War was marked by the collapse of the USSR, which had transformed the 
bipolar world order into a uni-polar order, and the US became the single superpower. The 
utterly structural change of global system was perceived as ‘the end of history’ by Fukuyama, 
which means ‘the endpoint of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of 
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Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.’  (Fukuyama, 1989). The 
US, as the leading promoter of the Western liberal value, had thus set a goal to defend the 
principle of ‘democracy, freedom and human rights’ and had constructed its identity to the rest 
of the world as ‘a world police’ against any challenge to this established universal value.  
The US authority has defined itself as a global leader pursuing democracy and peace and the 
American people as part of this ‘imagined community’ of the US nations (Jutta Weldes, 1996). 
On the other hand, it has labelled those states which had posed threat to the US national interest, 
for example, the North Korea, as the ‘rogue state’. Based on this recognition of identity, the US 
had claimed to make foreign policies to form the ‘security umbrella’ in the Asia-Pacific region 
against the common enemies. After 9/11, the US identity was regarded as ‘reproducing and 
representing US leadership in a global fight for freedom against a variety of mutating 
threats’(Rowley and Weldes, 2012). In the narrative of imperialist, Post-Cold War foreign 
policy was about the defence and expansion of US empire.(ibid). Imperialism is defined as ‘the 
practice, theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling in a distant 
territory’ and colonialism as the ‘implanting of settlements on a distant territory’ (Said, 1993). 
The imperialist basis of policy-making in the US follows a logic of zero-sum model, which was 
a legacy from the bipolar competition during the Cold War. The Zero-sum model is a logic in 
which ‘the winnings of some players must equal the losses of the others.’(The New Dictionary 
of Cultural Literacy). “With limited resources, it is believed that the policies made by the state 
will lead to the gain of one side and the loss of the other. Under this logic, foreign policies will 
be made on the basis of trade-offs between competing interests.”(Town, 2015) 
Nevertheless, the 21st century sees the US identity as a hegemon declining, with the panic that 
other powers are rising in Asia-Pacific(Ratner, 2013). From a zero-sum perspective, the US 
sees the other rising powers as a threat to its national interest and challenge to its global 
leadership, especially China. It is within this context that the US tends to make foreign policies 
which constrain growing powers in the region, and ensure its own security. Foreign policy is 
couched in phrases of how this helps the Americas and how it hurts their rivals. By adopting 
that mindset, policy creators in Washington and other capitals ensure that those results are the 
only ones that are acceptable.(Towns, 2015). In the imperialist narrative, ‘the US continues to 
engage in exploitative economic practices, political intervention, and military action in and 
against other states’ (Blum, 2003). This approach in US foreign policy is well represented in 
the 2010 Asia rebalancing strategy. 
How is US identity represented in its foreign policy? 
In its own construction of the identity, the US had claimed itself as the promoter of the Western 
market model, individualist lifestyle and Liberal Democracy spread all over the world, regarded 
as something of universal value. The US was trying to set up the rules and regulations in the 
region, it is portrayed as a declining power with ambitions to dominate Asia-Pacific region. 
(Wang, 1997). 
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Bush 41’s administration 
The US government under George H.W. Bush, following the end of the Cold War, had seen a 
New World Order (NWO) which reinstates the US leadership, ‘where diverse nations are 
drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind -- peace and 
security, freedom, and the rule of law.’ (Bush, 1991). Under Bush administration, the US 
identity had been enhanced as a global leader and a promoter of the free world, as Bush had 
addressed the Congress on January 29th in 1991: ‘We're the only nation on this Earth that could 
assemble the forces of peace. This is the burden of leadership and the strength that has made 
America the beacon of freedom in a searching world.’(Bush, 1991) 
Clinton’s administration 
Clinton had focused on the liberalization and US domestic economy, and to some extent the 
government had ’severely downgraded foreign policy in his priority’(Scalapino,1996). On the 
other hand, he had proposed the concept of ‘New Pacific Community’ in an expectation to 
peace in the Asia-Pacific area. Based on this concept, Clinton’s America was a period which 
sees less of an imperialist identity and more of a democratic strategy. This strategy was further 
developed as the Americans had suggested an extension of the role of APEC to include dealing 
with regional security issues. In relations to the development with China, Clinton strongly 
defended his continued policy of "constructive engagement" during the summit with President 
Jiang Zemin-- promoting economic and political ties, while at the same time pressing for 
democracy, open markets and human rights -- calling it "our best hope to secure our own 
interest and values and to advance China's."(Clinton, 1997). 
Clinton believed that the U.S. should not be, nor could it afford to be, the ‘international police’ 
(Todd, 2002). This had led to a lack of commitment and respect of international institutions 
from the Clinton administration, which was the key instrument for the US imperialist ambitions 
(Ikenberry, 2006). Nevertheless, the rest of the government under Clinton did stress the high 
standing of the US in the world. In the article ‘The Myth of the Indispensable Nation’ from 
‘Foreign Policy’, the quote of Madeleine Albright, Clinton’s Secretary of State, has been 
highlighted: ‘we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other 
countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.’ (Albright, 1998) 
Bush 43’s administration 
The Terrorist attack on 11th September 2011 had triggered the ‘war on terror’. It is suggested 
that the US under George W. Bush had used the terrorist event of 9/11 to legitimize 
imperialism and secure long-term supremacy in both military and economic aspects. In 2012 
Farewell assessed the extent to which the Post 9/11 U.S. Foreign Policy was a continuation of 
previously established ‘New Imperialist’ Ambitions, as the U.S. imperialism ‘presupposes the 
will and the ability of an imperial centre to define as imperial its own national interests and 
enforce them worldwide in the anarchy of the international system’ (Osterhammel, 1995). 
Bush’s administration had also constructed its identity against its enemies through international 
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interactions. With the United States cementing their military hegemony and assuming roles 
within international institutions, the belief that the U.S.’s position in the world was to be the 
‘good’ force acting against the antagonistic ‘evil’ of the Iraqi ‘rogue state’ became 
widespread.’(Farewell, 2012) 
While Bush’s government grants extensive military spend and political weight in fighting the 
terrorist, the world sees the US gradually losing influence in Asia-Pacific area. Especially after 
the financial crisis of 2008 lowered the US economic credibility, and the rise of China with 
growing economic capacity in the region, a regional imbalance regarding the US decline has 
appeared.  
Obama’s administration 
It was under this context that the US government under Obama recognised the necessity to 
reinstate its influence in Asia, and shift its focus from the war on terror to its regional 
leadership in Asia. Obama had put forward the Asia rebalancing strategy in 2010 to ‘Sustain a 
long-term strategic presence in the Asia Pacific, especially through a strong maritime 
focus’(Emmers,2013). In the imperialist narrative, this is a strategy to contain China’s rising 
influence in the region, initiated based on a zero-sum understanding of the world politics. The 
economic health of the US is dependent on a strong China, but a strong China becomes a 
political and military threat.  Zero Sum politics will exacerbate that situation and create a 
mirror of the two super-power systems that created the Cold War. On the other hand, however, 
The US could cooperate with China and move away from Zero-Sum Politics, where 
‘Compromise and sensible solutions, for ourselves, our allies and the Chinese people can create 
a situation where there are no winners and losers, where victory is not an end in itself.’ (Towns, 
2015).  
The US authority had claimed that its Rebalancing Strategy mainly has four objectives. Firstly, 
to strengthen and modernise alliances in Asia-Pacific region. The US had established strong 
military relationships with Japan, Korea, Philippines, Thailand and Australia since 2009, to 
increase collaborations against those rising powers which poses threats to the US security and 
leadership. Secondly, to advance economic integrations. This intention is represented by the US 
initiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2016, which has been claimed as the largest 
trade and investment deal in the world. Thirdly, to shape regional institutions ASEAN and 
APEC. Fourthly, to enhance the coalition with emerging powers e.g. India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam.  
From the US perspective, this policy is to construct the US identity as a defender of the global 
security and develop cooperations for global economy. Its relationship with China had 
demonstrated an intention to establish a partnership to jointly face global issues: the nuclear 
deterrence discussion represented by NPT, ‘the war on terror’ against terrorist group notably 
ISIS and the conflict in Syria, the global economy and climate change. The US had made an 
effort to work through these issues with China by the frequent meetings between Obama and 
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the former Chinese President Hu Jintao, and even proposed to form ‘a group of two’(Bergsten, 
2005), as the idea of G-2 was initiated by C. Fred Bergsten in his book the United States and 
the World Economy. 
On the other hand, the bilateral treaty obligations remain firm between the US and the rising 
powers in Asia-Pacific. ‘Washington’s preference has been for a series of largely discrete 
bilateral ties in Asia, with the US acting as the hub, enabling bilateralism to be combined into a 
larger operative force when necessary or appropriate’(Scalapino, 1996). The theory of ‘hub-
and-spoke’ system (Ikenberry, 2004) had laid the groundwork for this view, it means the 
American-led system of bilateral security ties with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and countries to 
the South. East Asian countries export goods to America and America exports security to the 
region. It is important for them to build up coalition with the US, as the close security ties 
enable them to pursue an export-oriented development path. (Ikenberry, 2004) 
The ‘hub-and-spoke’ system has enabled the US to gain diplomatic support by providing 
strategic protections. Scholars like Wang Jisi had pointed out that the Asia rebalancing strategy 
was aimed at containing and constraining China in Asia-Pacific, in the fear of a rising China 
challenging the US interest. (Wang, 1997). It is also part of the strategy to increase the military 
deployment and army bases in Asia-Pacific, and its large number of troop deployment to 
China’s neighbour countries had substantiated its containment policy towards China through 
military forces. (See Graph 1). Notably, the Philippines, the loyalist ally of the US in Southeast 
Asia, has played hardship on China with US support in its back. 
 
Cambridge Journal of China Studies 
31 
 
Graph 1. US troop deployment under rebalancing policy 
 
 
The US ‘pivot’ in Asia was reflected by the amount of its military deployment, which has led to 
the instability of the region(Ratner, 2013). From a constructivist perspective, this bilateral 
security ties between the US and those countries in Asia-Pacific had ‘deepened’ the Beijing 
view that ‘the ultimate goal of the US in world affairs is to maintain its hegemony and 
dominance’, as argued by Wang Jisi (cited by Ratner, 2013). 
Another aim of the strategy is to shape the regional institution in the US interests, as well as 
strengthening regional organisation and decision-making mechanisms, for example, APEC: 
‘Washington is eager to make APEC into an instrument for substantive advances in regional 
free trade rather than merely a dialogue’(Scalapino, 1996). 
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The US had constructed its identity as a democratic superpower through the coalitions in the 
region, as ‘American policies were promoting coalitions against what was termed the 
imposition of American values and standards on Asian culture’(Scalapino, 1996). Meanwhile, 
the US perceives its competition with China of the influence in the region, and respond in a 
zero-sum logic. ‘The US views China as having already become a major influence in Asia, and 
important with respect to every sub-regional and regional issue’(Ball, 2013). The US bilateral 
coalition in the region could be a strike-back leading to a reduction of foreign investment in 
China and difficulty for China to invest in others in return.  
A good example is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) deal. Led by the US, the deal was 
signed by twelve countries in Asia-Pacific in February 2016, representing roughly 40% of the 
world's economic output (BBC, 2017). Obama had framed TPP, which excluded China, as an 
effort to write Asia’s trade rules before Beijing could, establishing US economic leadership in 
the region as part of his ‘pivot to Asia’(Holland and Rascoe, 2017). This could be a counter-
attack in response to the Chinese initiated Free Trade Area(FTA), acting on the zero-sum logic. 
In an overview, since the end of the Cold War, the US had been taking itself as the global 
leader committed to building up a free world. As declared by Bush that the US has the 
‘responsibility’ of being the leader of a global coalition fight for freedom, defending itself and 
its allies (Bush, 2001). In 1999, it had been claimed that the US leadership continues to be 
presented as natural: ’people are looking to America’, to ‘American leadership and America’s 
troops’ to get the troop done(Clinton,1999). Whereas in the eyes of Obama, the US 
acts ’boldly’ and with ‘resolve’, has ‘responsibilities’ and ‘commitments’ (Rowley and Weldes, 
2012). 
The US foreign policies in the post-cold war era are in general reasserting its dominant role in 
Asia-Pacific, from Bush 41’s New World Order, Bush 43’s ‘war on terror’, to Obama’s ‘Asia-
rebalancing strategy’, US had demonstrated ambitions of exerting influence on other countries 
in the region, and contain China’s rise on the purpose to maintain the US leadership in the 
region.      
The US authority constructs its national identity as a democracy promoter to ensure the 
building of ‘a free world’. Nevertheless, it has undermined this identity by focusing its foreign 
policies in Asia-Pacific on strengthening the bilateral military ties and forming allies. This has 
made its construction of a democracy promoter a failure, as in the eyes of Beijing, the policy 
aims to ensure the US domination in the region, instead of promoting democracy(Wang, 1997). 
In contrast, China has developed its cooperation with partner countries in Asia-Pacific, and 
successfully enhanced its national identity as a peaceful developing power. 
3. CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICIES AFTER THE COLD WAR: 
The Cold War stands for the conflict between the Soviet-led communist camp and the US-led 
western alliance, ended by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which led to a chain-effect of 
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breaking down on the communist states. It was under this context that the Directive Deng 
considered stability as the national priority and his "24-Character Strategy" emerged in 1990 
has reflected the Chinese Communist Party(CCP)’s sense of alarm following the collapse of the 
communist states of Eastern Europe. The strategy provided basic principles on how China 
should protect its national interests while increasing its interactions with the world 
(Acknowledge to source),  and was well-followed by the peaceful rising strategy in 2000. 
China’s strategies had influenced the trading structure in Asia-Pacific region, which other 
countries are gradually integrated into. Despite its influence, China had claimed that its core 
strategic interest is the integrity of national territory and the development of domestic economy. 
Both Deng(1974) and Xi(2015) had made announcement that China will ‘Never claim 
hegemony’. 
‘One Belt One Road’(OBOR) is the key strategy reflecting this ‘no hegemony’ claim, which 
China is now undertaking to represent its ‘peaceful rising’ identity. As a background of OBOR, 
the idea was originated from the Silk Road in Han Dynasty more than two thousand years ago. 
The Silk Road is an overland route from China to the West, which brought silk to Rome, 
connecting the east and the west, and led to a time of golden age for China’s relations with 
other countries. It is ‘the longest, and from a cultural-historical standpoint the most significant 
connecting link between peoples and continents that has ever existed on earth’(Hedin,1938). 
In 2013, China’s president, Xi Jinping, proposed a modern equivalent, a network of railways, 
roads, pipelines, and utility grids linking China and Central Asia, West Asia, and parts of South 
Asia. Following Xi’s proposal, the State Council authorized an OBOR action plan in 2015 with 
two main components: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road 
(See Graph 2). The Economic Belt was based on Xi’s idea of the modern Silk Road, while the 
Maritime Silk Road connects the regional waterways. 
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Graph 2 
 
 
More than 60 countries, with a combined GDP of $21 trillion, have expressed interest in 
participating in the OBOR action plan.(Tian, 2016).  
As to develop a win-win cooperation through the OBOR policy, China seeks to take the 
interests of all parties into account to generate mutual benefits, including environmental 
management and closer cultural exchanges(ibid). Nevertheless, Some commentators doubt the 
rationality of the One Belt One Road policy, asserting that the policy aims to expand its 
political influence in the Asia-Pacific region and compete with the US for regional leadership 
(Lu, 2016). These assertions are derived from the Cold War logic, with the traditional Western 
thought of Zero-Sum game. 
The Cold-war logic sees the world resources as limited, people must compete for the 
consumable coal and fuel of global preservation. In contrast, the spirit of mutual benefit and 
win-win cooperation has accelerated the development of this ‘Silk Road’, and embedded in the 
new logic of ‘One Belt One Road’. The logic that win-win cooperation could be sustained 
between states, and construct new profit points for all the states to explore the critical resources 
Cambridge Journal of China Studies 
35 
of human being is reflected in Xi’s statement that: ‘One Belt One Road’ is open and tolerant, 
we welcome the international organisations and all the countries in the world, including the US, 
to join in the cooperation.’(Xi, 2015). The proposition of China’s OBOR appears to be neither 
closed nor narrow, and reflects a difference from the US-led TPP in nature, as evidenced by 
Wang Jisi: ‘Thus, while One Belt One Road works to build up the Chinese Dream, it will also 
help the countries on the road to achieving modernization, and in this way, devote Chinese 
commitment to the worldwide development.’(Wang, 2016). 
Additionally, the OBOR policy had reflected the necessity of building a new type of 
international relationship centres on cooperation and mutual benefits. On Xi’s remark to the 
70th anniversary of the Second World War, he pointed out that the history of war had taught us 
competition and hegemony are driving human away from peace in a society of co-existence. 
‘Peace not war, cooperation not confrontation, win-win not zero-sum, should be the eternal 
theme of peace, progress and development in human society’(Xi, 2015). Different from the old 
notion of confrontation and zero-sum game, OBOR advocates cooperation and win-win 
strategy, which has fundamental difference from the ‘cooperation’ under the hegemonic order 
following impartial rules (Wang, 2016). 
Another key features of the win-win cooperation is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB), a multilateral development banks (MDB) initiated by China, officially launched on 24 
October 2014. It was claimed that the AIIB ’focus on infrastructure construction in Asia to 
promote regional connectivity and economic cooperation’ (Lou Jiwei, 2014). This 
demonstrated a different approach from the regional banks set up under the admission of the 
US, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank(ADB) which prioritise poverty reduction 
(Ba, 2014).  
The regional forum of APEC was also important, Beijing has held the 26th APEC forum in 
2014, with the theme: Shaping the future through Asia-Pacific partnership. On the Opening 
ceremony, Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that China has committed to ‘build closer 
partnership with APEC members who are neighbours’ and ‘enhance cooperation that creates 
mutual benefit’ (Wang,2014). The fundamental win-win approach had been reaffirmed with 
APEC ‘to promote the establishment of an open, inclusive, balanced and win-win new 
architecture for Asia-Pacific economic cooperation’(ibid), which is a significant development 
from  the initial aspiration of APEC: ‘benefit not only the region but to enhance worldwide 
economic prospects’(Evans, 1989). 
The 21st century also sees an increasing weight of China in the regional economy in East Asia 
and Southeast Asia, this is reflected by China’s contribution in promoting the trades and 
enhancing regional connectivity, as ‘China’s entrance into the regional political economy has 
similarly been associated with the increase in intra-East Asian trade’(Ba, 2014). A clear win-
win strategy works on the relationship between China and other East Asian countries, as China 
has offered a steadily expanding market for South-east Asian goods and services. A good 
example for this expanding market is the massive growth of ASEAN exports to China, 
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‘ASEAN exports to China experienced a 138% increase between 1996 and 2002, a time when 
ASEAN’s export to the US and Japan were declining’(Ba, 2014). 
Despite the growing influence of China in East Asia, ‘the old American hegemonic order will 
remain a critical component of East Asian order for decades to come[...] Even China has 
incentives to preserve and work within an American hub-and-spoke system in the short and 
medium term.’ (Ikenberry, 2004). It was unlikely that China would challenge the legitimacy of 
a US-dominated regional system and propose its own alternative in near future. However, 
commentators such as Ralf Emmers have perceived China as a threatening role because its 
persistent activities in maritime Southeast Asia. China’s official claim of the South China Sea 
was interpreted as an expansion of territory, despite China has announced that the preservation 
of its historical sea territory is as an act to protect its core strategic interest.  
On a higher level of assessment, the rise of China could be evaluated in relations to the US 
decline, the degrading of the US as a hegemonic power had led to an even growing trend for a 
closer relationship between China and other countries in Asia-Pacific. It is a complex cause-
effect relationship that leads to the dynamic of the system in Asia-Pacific in relations to the 
influence of the US and China. This is reflected in the case where ASEAN countries swing 
between China and the US. To some extent, the rise of China had caused strategic panic of its 
neighbor countries, and some had responded by seeking stronger security from the US, e.g. the 
Philippines. The other countries in the region sense the benefit of developing a stronger 
relationship with China, especially for their economic interests. It appears to be the long-term 
commission for China to convince more countries to take this interest, and in a cooperation, 
purse a peaceful rising development.  
Chinese identity & foreign policy   
China has constructed its national identity centred on the Confucian value of peace: China as a 
peacefully rising country seeking cooperation with other actors in Asia-Pacific, aims to enhance 
regional integration and development, and to ultimately achieve common prosperity of a 
peaceful world. The Confucian value was originated in China more than two thousand years 
ago and had a long-term impact on Asian culture and value. This is a value which emphasis 
group economic social interest rather than individual’s freedom and right, think highly of social 
stability, solve problems by reaching agreement rather than confrontation (Zheng, 2016). A 
significant range of countries in Asia Pacific had shared this traditional value, and China’s 
promotion of it was very helpful to enhance regional connectivity.  
It is from this Confucius-based Asian value that China has adopted a peaceful rising strategy 
since 2000, developed from the 24-Character Strategy initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1990, that 
‘observe the development soberly, maintain our position, meet the challenge calmly, hide our 
capacity, bide our time, remain free of ambitions, and never claim leadership’(Deng, 1990). In 
recent decades, President Xi Jinping has furthered the ‘peaceful rising’ narrative and adopted a 
strategy of ‘peaceful development’ (Men, 2007) which aims to grow economic capacity, 
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encourage domestic business, and strengthen trade relationship with foreign actors, under the 
principle of win-win cooperation.  
Entering the 21st century, China has become the world’s second largest economy. It has 
significant growth in foreign investment and trade, which helps to construct its identity as a 
peaceful rising power. The win-win cooperation has been enhanced as China became a key 
business partner with other Asian countries and actively engaged in regional institutions, e.g. 
ASEAN, APEC.  
In the present days, the national identity is notably illustrated by the ‘One Belt One Road’ 
(OBOR) policy initiated by President Xi in 2013. This initiative aims to create the world’s 
largest platform for economic cooperation, including policy coordination, trade and financing 
collaboration, and social and cultural cooperation (Tian, 2016). This policy had represented a 
win-win approach aimed at developing cooperation with the countries in Erosia, and in Asia-
Pacific. Through this approach, the Chinese authority is constructing its identity as a peacefully 
rising power to other countries. This approach is also reflected by the initiative of Asia 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the mutually beneficial bond between China and 
ASEAN. 
Militarily, China claimed to act on the principle of self-defense, whereas some Western 
scholars are suggesting a ‘China threat theory’ on account of the observation of some territorial 
disputes relating to China, notably the South China Sea issue. In response, the Chinese 
government had stressed its priority of foreign policies in maintaining internal stability, and to 
promote the economic globalisation. President Xi had delivered the message in his recent 
speech in Davos, that China would be glad to lead the path of economic globalisation: ‘We will 
advance the building of the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific and negotiations of the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership(RCEP) to form a global network of free trade 
arrangements.’(Xi, 2017).   
China has claimed that the policy stands for a win-win approach in regional cooperation, as it 
was asserted that ‘China stands for concluding open, transparent and win-win regional free 
trade arrangements and opposes forming exclusive groups that are fragmented in nature.’(ibid). 
Whereas from the western perspective, China is rising as an ambitious superpower and seeks to 
challenge the US leadership in the region through these policies. 
In sum, China has constructed its identity as a peaceful developing power by implementing a 
series of foreign policies in Asia-Pacific, notably the OBOR strategy. It takes a standpoint to 
develop regional integration through its interaction with the ASEAN countries. Some other 
parts of the world see the rising of Chinese influence in the region as bearing a hegemonial 
ambition to challenge the US leadership. The conflict is represented in the case of South China 
Sea, despite China’s claim of self defence, other claimants allied with the US and embroiled in 
the disputed water, perceiving China as a threat.  
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4. ASEAN AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITIES 
ASEAN, a key regional organisation in the Asia-Pacific area that promotes intergovernmental 
cooperation, consists of ten member states in Southeast Asia: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Both China and 
the US have developed important partnership with these member states, each is making effort 
to shape the structure of the institution in its own way. The United States sees ASEAN as vital 
to its strategic rebalance to Asia (Albert, 2016). In the meantime, China regards highly of its 
maritime claim in the South China Sea, an ongoing issue not only involves China and the four 
ASEAN claimants of the territorial waters, but also the US playing a key role in the case, as an 
influential ally to the Philippines and other ASEAN states.  
Entering the 21st century, China increased foreign investment in South-east Asian, it ‘is clearly 
emerging as an increasingly influential economic force for East Asian integration’(Ba, 2014). It 
was accounted that for ASEAN’s total exports, China-bound exports grew ‘from 4% in 2001 to 
9% in 2008, while US-bound ASEAN exports dropped 7.5% in relative importance.’(ibid). 
Also, Chinese aid on ASEAN led to a development of regional connectivity, notably the 
‘remarkable’ aid package in April 2009, included ’a US$10 billion contribution to initiate a 
China-ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund’(Reilly,2013). Along with the prospect of a 
declining US domination in the region, China grows in its capacity to support East Asia’s 
interdependent economies, a key feature to present this potential is ASEAN-China Free Trade 
Area(ACFTA), implemented in 2010, which is ‘a much more deliberate effort to integrate the 
Chinese and South-east Asian economies’(Ba, 2014). 
The Constructivist Acharya has argued that the US declined as a hegemon power in relations to 
ASEAN, and that ’the decline of the structural power of the US has opened opportunities for 
other actors’(Acharya, 1997). Reflecting on Hurd’s theory that the structure ‘makes’ the 
identity of agents by shaping their interactions(Hurd,2008), the structure of system in Southeast 
Asia had shaped the interaction between China and ASEAN, while ASEAN was growing with 
the expansion of trade partners, China played a critical role as a rising power to integrate into 
such a regional institution for its ‘peaceful development’. On the other hand, the integration 
helped to eliminate the US policy of ‘containment’ towards China, where it is of strategic 
interest for China to engage in a multilateral cooperative security pact with ASEAN, in 
response to geo-political restraints come unilaterally from the America.  
Through the investment and partnership, China’s identity in relations to ASEAN varies with the 
thickness of the institutional environment. For example, China’s enhanced collaboration with 
Laos and Cambodia is viewed as based on the idea of socialization(Reilly, 2012), whereas its 
aid to Myanmar remains largely self-interested. In the eyes of the critics, Beijing’s growing 
influence in those three CLM states means a sign of dominating the region, where ‘Suspicious 
of Chinese hegemonial ambitions, ASEAN enlargement was chiefly directed by security 
concerns’(Ruland, 2000), and the concern was raised further by China’s territorial claims in the 
South China Sea. Nevertheless, the above critics had neglected the fact that ASEAN is a well-
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established institution in Southeast Asia, which had its long-term organized system, unlikely to 
be changed by the rising influence of China in the near future. 
In the case of South China Sea, there have been long-term territorial disputes between China 
and the other claimants in Southeast Asia. The South China sea is valuable for its rich resources 
of potential oil and gas reserves, 10% global fishing production. On top of this is its strategic 
placement, as the Spratly islands gives the South China Sea claimants an extra fifteen hundred 
kilometres of influence, and the waterway was ‘one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes that 
carry more than $5 trillion in annual trade.’ (Mathieson, 2017). 
China claimed that its legitimacy over the water is proven by a 1940s map, as a historical 
waterland under Chinese sovereignty. ‘China claims some 80% of the South China Sea, 
including various rocky reefs and shoals disputed by Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and 
the Philippines.’(Kilpatrick, 2017). However, The Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled against 
China's overarching claims by declaring that "historical rights" put forward by Beijing had no 
legal basis, while The US authority claimed that US is concerned about the freedom of 
navigation in South China Sea, based on the principles of The United Nations Law of the Sea 
Convention. In response, Beijing claims it has no intention of preventing commercial traffic, 
but simply protects its own territory, and makes its standpoint as in a state of self-defence. 
Beijing viewed the US movement as an external interference. ‘For China, the US has created an 
issue over the freedom of navigation to justify an enhanced military presence in the region to 
contain China’(Emmers, 2013). Whereas the US was perceived as the ‘world policeman’ by the 
Southeast claimants, who reaffirmed the international law and defended the right of freedom as 
a global principle. A similar approach was expressed by US government, at the ARF in July 
2010, Hillary Clinton declared that the US has a national interest in freedom of navigation(FON) 
in the South China Sea, where a ’strategic turn to the region fits logically into our overall global 
effort to secure and sustain America’s global leadership’(Clinton, 2011).  
Later the situation was moderated by Obama at EAS 2011, it was restated that the US takes no 
side in the disputes, only preserves its interests include FON and unimpeded international 
commerce in the region. On Beijing’s part, there’s also a sign of moderation as Premier Wen 
reaffirming the freedom of navigation principle and calling for peaceful resolution of the 
disputes. This interaction between the US and China reflected a change from confrontation to 
reconciliation, and the US had declined its claim of a national interest in South China Sea and 
focus more on the commercial interest. However, the subsequent six FON operations to ‘test 
Chinese claims and assert the U.S. position that the contested features lay in international 
waters.’(Kilpatrick, 2017), has reflected the remaining diplomatic intentions of the US over the 
sea, and the US identity retained as a hegemonic power holding control over the region, trying 
to exert its power by allying with ASEAN countries such as Philippines, urge and supply them 
to confront China in South China Sea. 
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In sum, the Asia-rebalancing strategy had strengthened bilateral security pacts between the US 
and countries like Vietnam and Philippines, where additional diplomatic leverage are provided 
to boost the activities in confrontation with Beijing. ‘Manila has reinforced its defence 
arrangement with the US, increasing the amount of joint naval exercises, and asking the US to 
deploy spy planes in the South China Sea area.’(Emmers, 2013). China perceives this 
rebalancing strategy and the focus on the South China Sea as a US intention to contain China’s 
peaceful rise in Asia, which is associated with the increase of US allocation of troops and 
means to the region to strengthen the bilateral alliances. 
5. DISCUSSION: THE US/CHINA RELATIONS AND THEIR IDENTITIES  
Today, China commits to revive the traditional Chinese value, and especially centres on the 
Confucian thought, whereas the West holds the prevailing idea of ‘Might is Right’(Zheng, 
2016). In the light of the identities China and the US have perceived themselves, they had 
established a ‘New Type of relationship’, which describe shared goals in the bilateral 
relationship, avoiding zero-sum competition and expanding areas of cooperation (Ratner, 2013). 
This relationship is a development from the idea of ‘G-2’, meaning the US and China as two 
superpowers in a sustainable bond, which was initiated by Fred Bergsten in 2005.  
Chinese scholars like Wang Jisi had given a general negative view on the US, seeing it getting 
control of the Asia-Pacific region to constrain China’s influence. The US was perceived as 
allying with other Asian countries to contain China and eliminating its potential challenge to 
the US leadership, in response, this pivot in Asia had led to an insecure China (Ratner, 2013). 
On the US side, it gives a relatively complicated view on China. On one hand it needs to 
sustain a positive relationship with China for economic cooperation (especially when China 
becomes its biggest debtor country). On the other, the US constantly perceives China as its 
greatest threat to the global leadership. This speculation grounded the claims of some western 
commentators  that China establishes regional institutions to form coalitions against the US. It 
is also suggested that East Asian countries rely less on the US because of China’s rise  
(Emmers, 2013). 
The newest vision of the longstanding “China Threat Theory” draws onto the ‘thucydides trap 
theory’, based on the quote from ancient historian Thucydides: “It was the rise of Athens, and 
the fear that this inspired in Sparta, that made war inevitable.”(ibid). The model was used by 
politics people to predict a likely warfare between two nations, China and the US are 
commonly identified as a pair that is potentially engaged in such a trap. The rise of China in 
relations to the ‘Thucydides Trap’ was first analysed by Graham Allison, who has argued that 
certain trap arising between the US and China in the Asia-Pacific. 
In response to this ‘trap theory’, President Xi has presented himself as a constructivist, he 
emphasized the importance of mutual intentions and interactions between China and the US, 
rejected the pessimistic prospect of the competition embedded in the bilateral relation. It is, 
therefore, the solution to avoid the ‘Thucydides Trap’ by enhancing positive co-operations such 
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as OBOR. However, in the eyes of sensitive Americans, China’s ambitious “Belt and Road” 
strategy was nothing more than a parody of the Marshall Plan. (Mo & Chen, 2016). On 
reflection of this, it is the crisis of trust between the Americans and the Chinese that could lead 
to peril, and embroils the two states into the so-called ‘Thucydides Trap’. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This essay has argued from a constructivist view that China and the US identities and their 
foreign policies have changed through their interactions with each other and other countries in 
Asia-Pacific. China has constructed its identity based on Confucian idea, which gives the 
foundation for its ‘peaceful development’ strategy, and a cooperative approach in foreign 
policies, e.g. One Belt One Road (OBOR). Whereas in the eyes of some pro-west countries, 
China is a threatening communist power tends to challenge the existing order. The South China 
Sea issue has significantly reflected this kind of view as China’s claim to the water was 
perceived as an ambition to expand its territory. On the other side, the American identity was 
perceived by others as a ’global leader’, where its allies see it as a leading power and tend to 
follow its order, and the US made foreign policies to strengthen the coalition and fulfil its 
leadership, e.g. the TTP coalitions. From China’s perspective, the US is taking a strategy to 
contain and constrain China, as it sees China’s rise challenging and threatening its leadership, 
and the US identity was shaped as an imperialist state persistent in maintaining its declining 
hegemony. 
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